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Abstract I analyze two expected utility models which abandon the consequentialist
assumption of terminal wealth positions. In the expected utility of gambling wealth
model, in which initial wealth is allowed to be small, I show that a large WTA/WTP
gap is possible and the (Rabin in Econometrica, 68(5), 1281–1292, 2000) paradox
may be resolved. Within the same model the classical preference reversal which
allows arbitrage is not possible, whereas preference reversal (involving buying prices
in place of selling prices), which does not allow arbitrage, is possible. In the expected
utility of wealth changes model, in which there is no initial wealth, I show that both
a WTA/WTP gap as well as the classical preference reversal are possible due to loss
aversion, both in its general as well as some specific forms.
Keywords Expected utility · Narrow framing · Rabin (2000) paradox · Preference
reversal · WTA/WTP disparity · Buying and selling price for a lottery
JEL Classifications D81 · D03 · C91
Willingness to accept (WTA) or selling price for a lottery is a minimal sure amount
of money which a person is willing to accept to forego the right to play the lottery.
Willingness to pay (WTP) or buying price for a lottery, on the other hand, is a maxi-
mal sure amount of money which a person is willing to pay in order to get the right to
play the lottery. The disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept is
a well-known phenomenon that arises in experimental settings. There is a large body
of evidence starting with Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Thaler (1980) that WTA is
much higher than WTP for many types of goods. Horowitz and McConnell (2002)
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is a survey which documents and analyzes results from a great number of experi-
ments and obtains mean values of the WTA/WTP ratio for different goods. The mean
WTA/WTP ratio for lotteries is 2.10 and it is small as compared to the same ratio for
other goods, especially non-market goods for which the average WTA/WTP ratio is
over 7. On the other hand Chilton et al. (2012) find that in the area of medical ser-
vices as the severity of health complaint is reduced, the WTA/WTP ratio converges
across the sample and does not exceed 1 significantly.
Despite the differences across different contexts and goods, WTA is on average
much higher in value than WTP. There have been many attempts to give account for
this phenomenon.
There is strong belief in the literature that this evidence is not consistent with
expected utility theory. Along the lines of Rubinstein (2006) I will argue that the
source of this belief lies in associating expected utility theory with the doctrine of
consequentialism, according to which “the decision maker makes all decisions hav-
ing in mind a preference relation over the same set of final consequences”. This
association is harmless when considering Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA),
as in this case decisions whether to accept a given lottery do not depend on wealth.
However, as many studies confirm, people usually exhibit Decreasing Absolute Risk
Aversion (DARA), in which case wealth effects are present.
In practice the doctrine of consequentialism means that the initial wealth under-
lying any decision whether to accept or reject a given lottery is assumed to be the
decision maker’s lifetime wealth. It follows that most lotteries under consideration
are small relative to initial wealth and therefore, by Rabin (2000)’s argument for any
reasonable level of risk aversion expected utility predicts approximate risk neutrality
towards such lotteries. In this case, not only is expected utility incapable of accommo-
dating large spreads between buying and selling price, but also it is inconsistent with
risk averse behavior for small gambles1. Instead of burying expected utility theory I
propose to divorce it from the doctrine of consequentialism, i.e. relax the assumption
that initial wealth underlying any decision whether to accept a gamble is total lifetime
wealth of the decision maker. If initial wealth is allowed to be small, I will show that
expected utility is consistent with large buying/selling price spreads, i.e. that within
expected utility for levels of risk aversion consistent with experimental evidence, one
can obtain a buying/selling price spread of the magnitude observed in experiments.
Following this finding I will propose an alternative for consequentialism involving
narrow framing. Instead of asserting that preferences are always defined over total
lifetime wealth, I will assume that preferences over gambling are defined over gam-
bling wealth, i.e this part of the decision maker’s total wealth which he designates for
taking gambles. The idea is taken from Foster and Hart (2009), although the seeds of
this approach, and in particular the idea of separating lifetime wealth and something
else for different decision problems, are already in Rubinstein (2006).
There are many papers on the disparity between willingness to accept and willing-
ness to pay for risky lotteries. It is part of a vast literature stream on WTA and WTP
valuations in general. For example, Schmidt et al. (2008) explain the WTA/WTP
1
“Small” here means “small relative to lifetime wealth”.
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spread for risky lotteries using prospect theory. They propose the third-generation
prospect theory, in which, unlike in the previous versions, the reference point is
allowed to be random. They show that loss aversion in such a model implies a pos-
itive WTA/WTP gap. In a recent paper Viscusi and Huber (2012) show on the basis
of a large experiment that in the case of environmental health risk probabilities the
WTA/WTP gap is due largely to the reference dependence effects related to costs.
Estimated income effects in their results were negligible.
In general, there have been many accounts for the disparity based on non-expected
utility models. My aim in this paper is not to offer a better explanation. My goal is
to show that large spreads between WTA and WTP, due entirely to wealth effects,
are possible within expected utility if only wealth is interpreted narrowly as gam-
bling wealth. The advantage of this approach is to show that one does not have to
depart from rationality so much (as in many behavioral models) in order to explain
WTA/WTP gaps as well as some other behavioral phenomena.
The approach I take in this paper in general is not novel. As I mentioned before,
Rubinstein (2006) claims that a lot of recent confusion around expected utility, which
led some researchers to question it as a descriptive theory, is caused by associat-
ing expected utility theory with the assumption of consequentialism—the idea that
there is a single preference relation over the set of all possible lotteries with prizes
being “final wealth levels”. For more discussion on the related literature please
refer to Section 2.3 on Rabin’s paradox. My approach is to apply this reasoning
which emerged when discussing Rabin’s paradox to a wider spectrum of topics,
such as for example the WTA/WTP gap. For more discussion on the doctrine of
consequentialism and different alternatives to it, see Section 4.
Related to buying/selling price disparity is the issue of preference reversal ana-
lyzed by Grether and Plott (1979). There are two lotteries called the $-bet and the
P-bet both of which promise some prize with some probability and nothing other-
wise, such that the probability of winning is higher for the P-bet but the prize is
bigger for the $-bet. Preference reversal occurs when selling price for the $-bet is
higher than that for the P-bet but the P-bet is preferred to the $-bet in a direct choice2.
A related possibility, which I call preference reversal B, occurs when the buying
price for the P-bet is higher than that for the $-bet and yet the $-bet is chosen over
the P-bet in a direct choice. I will show that traditional preference reversal is sus-
ceptible to arbitrage and is not possible within expected utility, whereas preference
reversal B is possible within expected utility and it does not allow arbitrage. This
result may suggest that traditional preference reversal is less rational than preference
reversal B.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 I introduce the model, its
assumptions, definitions of buying and selling price for a lottery and buying/selling
price reversal. Then I state a couple of technical propositions which describe the
2Experimentally, in order to confirm preference reversal one must show that the asymmetry described
above occurs more often than the opposite kind of asymmetry, i.e. when the $-bet is preferred in a direct
choice but the P-bet gets a higher selling price.
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shape and properties of the buying and selling price for a lottery for different risk
attitudes. Section 2 contains the main theses of the paper. Focusing on the con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class of utility functions, I demonstrate first
that expected utility with consequentialism is likely to predict risk neutral behav-
ior towards most gambles and eventually a gap between buying and selling price
becomes negligible. Second, I demonstrate that if the doctrine of consequentialism
is abandoned and wealth is allowed to move over the whole domain, significant
spreads between buying and selling price are possible due to income effects when
wealth is sufficiently small. As a next step, I propose an alternative to consequen-
tialism involving narrow framing. Instead of defining wealth as total lifetime wealth
of the decision maker I suggest using gambling wealth, which is that part of the
decision maker’s total wealth that he designates for the purpose of taking gambles.
I discuss ways to test this gambling wealth hypothesis. Then I compare gambling
wealth to the concept of pocket cash money introduced by Fudenberg and Levine
(2006) and show the similarities and differences between the two ideas. I also men-
tion ways of resolving Rabin’s paradox in the literature and how it relates to the
concept of gambling wealth and the concept of pocket cash money. In Section 3
I examine the possibility of what I call preference reversal B, which I compare
to the related concept of traditional preference reversal. I show that whereas pref-
erence reversal B is possible within an expected utility framework with gambling
wealth instead of total lifetime wealth and it does not allow arbitrage opportuni-
ties, preference reversal allows arbitrage opportunities and is not possible within
expected utility. Section 4 contains the discussion on consequentialism, the concept
around which much of the discussion and arguments in this paper are organized. This
section also discusses different alternatives to consequentialism. Section 5 discusses
expected utility over wealth changes as one of these alternatives departing from con-
sequentialism more radically than expected utility with gambling wealth. The issues
of WTA/WTP disparity and preference reversal are discussed for this model and the
results are compared with similar results for expected utility with gambling wealth.
Section 6 concludes. The Appendix at the end of this paper contains proofs of the
propositions.
1 The model
1.1 Basic definitions and assumptions
I start with basic assumptions and definitions.
Assumption 1 Preferences obey expected utility axioms. Bernoulli utility function
U : R → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
Definition 1 A lottery x is a real- and finite-valued random variable with finite sup-
port. The space of all lotteries will be denoted X . I define the maximal loss of lottery
x as: min(x) = min supp(x).
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The typical lottery will be denoted as x ≡ (x1, p1; ...; xn, pn), where xi ∈ R, i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n} are outcomes and pi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} the corresponding
probabilities. Outcomes should be interpreted here as monetary values. Although
most results that follow are true for more general lotteries, the finite support assump-
tion is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Now I define buying and selling price
for a lottery given wealth level along the lines of Raiffa (1968). To avoid repetitions,
I will henceforth skip statements of the form: “Given utility function U satisfying
Assumption 1, any lottery x and wealth W ...”.
Definition 2 I define selling price and buying price for a lottery x at wealth W as
functions of wealth W denoted, respectively, S(W, x) and B(W, x). Provided that
they exist, values of these functions will be determined by the following equations:
EU [W + x] = U [W + S(W, x)] (1)
EU [W + x − B(W, x)] = U(W) (2)
If utility function is defined over the whole real line as is the case for constant
absolute risk aversion, buying and selling price as functions of wealth exists for any
wealth level by Assumption 1. If the domain of the utility function is restricted to a
part of the real line as is the case of the constant relative risk aversion utility function
analyzed here, I will specify later on in the paper on which domain buying and selling
price are defined as functions of wealth.
In economic terms, given an individual with initial wealth W whose preferences
are represented by utility function U(·), S(W, x) is the minimal amount of money
which he demands for giving up lottery x. Similarly, B(W, x) is the maximal amount
of money which he is willing to pay in order to play lottery x. Additionally I define a
concept of buying/selling price reversal.
Definition 3 Given two lotteries x and y and some wealth level W , define buy-
ing/selling price reversal as:
S(W, y) > S(W, x) and B(W, x) > B(W, y)
This kind of preference pattern may be interpreted as follows. For a given initial
wealth, an individual’s certainty equivalent for lottery y is higher than for lottery x,
and yet he is willing to pay more to play lottery x than to play lottery y. In other
words, an individual exhibiting buying/selling price reversal may prefer to buy x than
y if he does not have the right to play any lottery initially. When, on the other hand,
he does have the right to play the lottery initially, he would prefer to sell x than y.
1.2 Preliminary results
Before introducing the main point of this paper I need a couple of theoretical results
which describe properties of buying and selling price for a lottery for different risk
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attitudes. The most basic property of buying and selling price which is true for any
concave strictly increasing utility function is the following:
Proposition 1.1 (Concave) For any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth W
such that buying and selling price exist, S(W, x) and B(W, x) lie in the interval
(min(x), E(x)). For a degenerate lottery x, S(W, x) = B(W, x) = x.
Proof In the Appendix.
Below I state propositions which characterize CARA, DARA and CRRA utility
functions in terms of buying and selling price. Proofs of these propositions may be
found for example in Lewandowski (2011) along with an extensive discussion on
multiplicative and nominal gambles and risk aversion notions for the two kinds of
gambles. I start with the results on CARA and DARA utility functions:
Proposition 1.2 (CARA) The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CARA
ii. Buying and selling price are independent from wealth and equal i.e.
B(W, x) = S(W, x) = Cα, ∀W
where α is absolute risk aversion coefficient and Cα takes real values and
depends only on α.
Proposition 1.3 (DARA) The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits DARA
ii. buying and selling price are increasing in W
B(W, x) > 0 ⇐⇒ B(W, x) < S(W, x)
for a non-degenerate lottery x.
The above propositions show that in the expected utility model a gap between
buying and selling price can only arise due to wealth effects. Selling price is higher
than buying price for a lottery for which I would be willing to pay a positive amount
only if absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth. In the subsequent analysis I will
be especially interested in the CRRA class, which is a subset of DARA:
Proposition 1.4 (CRRA) The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CRRA
ii. buying and selling price for any lottery are homogeneous of degree one i.e.
S(λW, λx) = λS(W, x), ∀λ > 0
B(λW, λx) = λB(W, x), ∀λ > 0
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2 Buying/selling price spread within the expected utility framework
2.1 Buying and selling price for CRRA class of utility functions
In this section I focus on the constant relative risk aversion utility class, since it is
simple and empirically well validated. For convenience but without loss of generality




1−α , 1 = α > 0, x > 0
log x, α = 1, x > 0 (3)
Parameter α is required to be bounded. I also focus on non-degenerate lotteries with
non-negative values such that outcome zero gets positive probability. This restriction
is a matter of convenience as the forthcoming results extend to the case of general
lotteries. The following proposition is necessary to establish the domain and the range
of buying and selling price for a lottery as functions of wealth for the case of CRRA
functions of the above form. Before I state this proposition a couple of remarks might
be useful. First, since the CRRA utility function used in this section is defined only
for positive real numbers I need to be sure that both sides of Eqs. 2 and 1 defining
buying and selling price are well defined. Second, notice that the CRRA function
of the above form is unbounded from below for α ≥ 1 and bounded from below
for 0 < α < 1. This is the reason why for 0 < α < 1 the infimum of B(W, x)
and S(W, x) cannot be equal to min(x), the lower bound given in Proposition 1.1. It
turns out that there is a certain threshold denoted by WL(x) ∈ (0, E[x]) such that the
infimum of B(W, x) and S(W, x) is equal to WL(x) + min(x) which is greater than
min(x).
Proposition 2.1 (CRRA2) Given the class of CRRA utility functions of the form
given by Eq. 3 the following holds for any non-degenerate lottery x: for α ≥ 1
• limW→0 B(W, x) = min(x)
• limW→−min(x) S(W, x) = min(x)
Define WL(x) = U−1[EU(− min(x) + x)]. For 0 < α < 1
• limW→WL(x) B(W, x) = WL(x) + min(x),• limW→−min(x) S(W, x) = WL(x) + min(x)
Additionally,
∀α > 0 lim
W→∞B(W, x) = limW→∞S(W, x) = E[x] (4)
Proof In the Appendix.
The above proposition establishes the domain and the range of buying and selling
price for a given lottery x as functions of wealth for CRRA utility functions which are
defined above. Now that I have introduced the necessary theoretical results, I proceed
to the main message of this paper.
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2.2 Expected utility and consequentialism
Consequentialism is a doctrine that says that an individual makes all decisions
according to a preference relation defined over one set of final consequences3. In
practice it means that initial wealth taken into account when making whatever deci-
sion is interpreted as the decision maker’s total lifetime wealth. Most lotteries which
a person may encounter are small relative to his lifetime wealth. In particular, lotter-
ies used in experiments have values which are small relative to total lifetime wealth
of experimental subjects. Therefore, to explain certain experimental results, it is suf-
ficient to focus on lotteries that have values which are negligible as compared to total
lifetime wealth. To represent this fact I assert here that lotteries have bounded values
and consequentialism approximately means that wealth tends to infinity. In this case
the following result holds:
Proposition 2.2 Expected utility with consequentialism and CRRA approximately
predicts no buying/selling price spread and risk neutrality.
Proof The proof follows directly from Eq. 4 in Proposition 2.1. We claim that con-
sequentialism implies that most lotteries encountered in practical decision-making
of a given individual have values which are very small compared to his/her lifetime
wealth. We shall represent this fact approximately by allowing wealth to go to infin-
ity with lottery values being bounded and fixed. What happens is that both selling
price and buying price tend to E[x] and hence the gap between them vanishes. Since
the distance E[x] − S(W, x) measures risk aversion, it is clear that there is no risk
aversion either.
This proposition is very similar to Rabin (2000)’s calibration theorem confined
to the CRRA class of utility functions. Reasonable levels of risk aversion for big
gambles give rise to risk neutral behavior towards small gambles within expected
utility with consequentialism. The difference between (Rabin 2000)’s argument is
that I claim after Rubinstein (2006) that this is due to consequentialism and not due
to expected utility itself.
This negative result immediately raises the issue of what happens if I drop the
assumption of consequentialism. To answer this question I proceed in two steps.
First, I show that relaxing consequentialism is promising, i.e. a large buying/selling
price for a lottery for reasonable levels of risk aversion may be obtained. Sec-
ond, I propose an alternative assumption which could replace the assumption of
consequentialism.
In the first step I allow wealth to vary freely. I will therefore analyze buying and
selling price for a lottery as functions of wealth. The goal is to see for what val-
ues of wealth is the spread between buying and selling price likely to be high.
3For an extensive discussion on consequentialism, its precise meaning and different alternatives to it, refer
to Section 4.
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To save on notation, given a fixed lottery x I shall write S(W, x) = S(W) and
B(W, x) = B(W). I define relative spread between buying and selling price as
follows:
τ (W) = S(W) − B(W)
B(W)
The following lemma can be used to infer certain properties of the relative gap
between buying and selling price.
Lemma 1 For a differentiable decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function,
given any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth level W , the following holds:
• B ′(W) < 1
• S ′(W − B(W)) = B′(W)1−B′(W) and hence S ′(W − B(W)) > B ′(W)
• B ′(W + S(W)) = S ′(W)1+S ′(W) and hence B ′(W + S(W)) < S ′(W)
• S ′(W) = S(W)−B(W)
B(W)
and B ′(W) = S(W)−B(W)
S(W)
for small positive S(W)
Proof In the Appendix.
Observe that the slope of buying price is always smaller than one whereas the slope
of selling price can be higher for small values of wealth. Before I state a proposition
describing the characteristics of the relative gap between buying and selling price I
need the following lemma:
Lemma 2 For a CRRA utility function, given any non-degenerate lottery x, S(W)
and B(W) are concave functions.
Proof See Lewandowski (2011).
I focus now on the case when S(W) > B(W) > 0. The remaining cases can be
analyzed similarly. By Proposition 2.1, to make sure that B(W) is positive I require
that min(x) cannot be lower than zero. The following proposition suggests that for
a CRRA utility function, the lower the wealth the higher the relative gap between
buying and selling price.
Proposition 2.3 For a CRRA utility function and any lottery x with min(x) ≥ 0, the
relative gap between buying and selling price τ (W) is strictly decreasing in W .
Proof In the Appendix.
This proposition already gives an explanation of why the buying/selling price gap
cannot be predicted within expected utility with consequentialism for small experi-
mental lotteries. The reason is that within expected utility, the gap between buying
and selling price is the highest for small values of wealth. So if initial wealth is small,
the expected utility model can accommodate large buying and selling price gaps.
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Using Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.3 it is possible to infer certain properties of
buying and selling price when data on relative gap between buying and selling price
is available. Also, in the opposite direction, it is possible to infer properties of the
relative gap between buying and selling price when certain properties of buying and
selling price are known.
The above mathematical results can be best illustrated on the basis of an example.
Let x be a lottery giving 100 euros or nothing with equal probabilities. The notation I
use for such a lottery is
(
100, 12 ; 0, 12
)
. Figure 1 contains graphs of selling and buying
price for lottery x in the upper row and relative spread between them as functions of
wealth W in the lower row, each of them for CRRA utility function for three different
coefficients of relative risk aversion: 1/2, 1 and 24.
Notice that as stated in the propositions above, buying and selling prices are













Hence buying and selling price for α = 0.5 are indeed between WL(x)+ min(x) and
E[x]. Notice also that buying and selling price are increasing and strictly concave in
wealth and that selling price is higher than buying price over the whole domain of
buying and selling prices. Finally as stated in Proposition 2.3 the relative gap indeed
is the highest for the minimal value of wealth for which both buying and selling price
are defined.
As illustrated by this simple example and stated formally in the propositions, the
smaller the wealth the greater the relative gap between buying and selling price. So
if wealth is small enough it is possible to obtain the gap between buying and selling
price consistent with experimental evidence for reasonable levels of risk aversion. I
will summarize this finding in a proposition.
Proposition 2.4 For levels of risk aversion which are consistent with experimental
evidence on risk attitudes, there exists levels of wealth such that the expected utility
model predicts a high relative gap between buying and selling price.
To make this finding more precise, notice that for the example above in the case
of logarithmic utility function (the middle figure in Fig. 1), we have the relative gap
between buying and selling price which is unbounded above as wealth tends to zero.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a selling price 30% higher than buying price
for the lottery in consideration and for different relative risk aversion coefficients
I need wealth levels which are listed in Table 1. For example to obtain a selling
price 30% higher than buying price for the lottery
(
100, 12 ; 0, 12
)
for the logarith-
mic utility function, an initial wealth level of almost 44 is necessary. In the next
4The CRRA utility function is of the form given in Eq. 3.
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Fig. 1 Buying/selling price spread for x for CRRA utility function
subsection I introduce gambling wealth. If one believes that the expected utility
model accurately predicts behavior, 44 would correspond to the calibrated gambling
wealth.
Assuming that the decision maker exhibits constant relative risk aversion, one can
calibrate pairs of wealth and relative risk aversion consistent with any given level of
relative gap between selling and buying price for a given lottery.
2.3 Expected utility with gambling wealth
I have argued above that expected utility with total wealth interpretation of wealth
predicts no gap between buying and selling price and risk neutrality for a wide range
of gambles used in experiments. On the other hand I have shown that if small values
of wealth are possible one can obtain large gaps between buying and selling price
for a lottery for reasonable levels of risk aversion. One way to proceed would be
to make wealth a free parameter of the model. Then, if one believes that expected
utility is a good descriptive model of behavior, then given the data on risky choices
one can calibrate which pairs of risk attitude and wealth level are consistent with
the data, as I have illustrated in Table 1. Unfortunately, by making wealth a free
parameter, the model loses much of its predictive power. In particular, it is harder to
falsify the model or design testable predictions. Another way to proceed is to give
wealth a new interpretation or, even better, to develop a theory of endogenous wealth
determination and then to test whether this new interpretation gives better answers
Table 1 Selling price 30%
higher than buying price α 0.5 1 2
W 35.15 43.94 51.57
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than consequentialist interpretation. Since at this point I am unable to offer a theory of
endogenous wealth determination, I will only propose a new interpretation of wealth
and ways to test it.
Gambling wealth Consequentialism assumption implies that when making any kind
of decision, people consider and have in mind their lifetime wealth. I think a good
alternative assumption is that people frame decisions narrowly and separate them
into categories. When they engage themselves in housing decisions they think about
a housing budget, when they consume they think about a consumption budget and
when they consider gambling or whether to accept or reject an offered gamble, they
consider a gambling budget. For the purposes of this paper I focus only on the gam-
bling category and a budget assigned to it, which I call gambling wealth. Gambling
wealth was proposed informally by Foster and Hart (2009). They define gambling
wealth as that part of total wealth designated only for taking gambles. Alternatively,
if W is wealth designated for the purposes of living, housing and consumption, then
gambling wealth is what is left over.
In light of the results from the previous subsection, one can argue that the idea
of gambling wealth, and more generally the idea of separate budgets for differ-
ent categories of decisions, could explain a number of interesting phenomena, for
example:
• Agents who gamble more have higher gambling wealth and therefore the buy-
ing and selling price gap for a given lottery is smaller than for less experienced
individuals
• If an object is treated narrowly the disparity should be higher; if it is integrated
into a wider set of objects the disparity should decrease (Hanemann 1991)
• Buying/selling price gap is more pronounced when objects of choice are not
monetary, e.g. coffee mugs. The more specific or narrowly defined the object of
choice is, the more pronounced wealth or income effects are.
The attractive feature of all these explanations is that they are all within the
expected utility framework. The only novel thing is the narrow framing with which
the expected utility model is supplemented. Naturally, a theory of endogenous wealth
determination would be much appreciated to make this kind of explanation fully
testable. At this point, however, it is necessary to design experiments to test the
gambling wealth hypothesis. An example of a very simple such experiment is the fol-
lowing. In the first stage subjects are given a small amount of money for trading in
gambles. Given different lotteries, buying price and selling price for them is elicited
for each subject. In the second stage subjects are given more money for trading in
gambles and again buying and selling price are elicited. Alternatively, instead of giv-
ing the subjects more money it is possible to scale down or up the lotteries being
played. If subjects exhibit constant relative risk aversion it should be equivalent to
increasing or decreasing initial wealth. If the gambling wealth explanation for the
gap between buying and selling price is correct, then the gap should decrease when
subjects are given more gambling money or if the lotteries are scaled down without
changing gambling wealth.
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Assuming the approach is valid then I propose the following experiment for cal-
ibrating gambling wealth. The experiment should be designed to test risk attitudes5
and at the same time to elicit selling and buying prices for lotteries. Given the data
it is then easy to calculate the underlying wealth level. This is then interpreted as
gambling wealth. More precisely, given observed buying and selling price for a
given lottery I can calculate a wealth-relative risk aversion coefficient pair which is
consistent with these prices.
The gambling wealth hypothesis is promising. However, until there is no theory
of endogenous gambling wealth determination, it cannot be fully testable. In the next
subsection I discuss another concept which is related to gambling wealth—the con-
cept of pocket cash by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). The advantage of the pocket
cash idea is that there is a theory of pocket cash determination. I would like to show
in what respect pocket cash and gambling wealth are similar and in what respect they
differ.
Pocket cash The idea of pocket cash money in the context of gambling decisions
is the following. If a small gamble is offered, an individual decides whether to take
it or not on the basis of what he has in his pockets, and hence pocket cash will be
the relevant wealth level for this decision. If, on the other hand, the same individual
is offered a big gamble the values of which significantly exceed what he has in his
pockets, the individual decides more carefully taking into account his lifetime wealth.
I will introduce now some details of the model.
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) develop a dynamic model in which the long-run self
controls the series of short-run selves. In each period t there are two subperiods:
• bank subperiod
– consumption is not possible
– wealth yt is divided between savings st , which remain in the bank, and
pocket cash xt which is carried to the nightclub
• nightclub subperiod
– consumption 0 ≤ ct ≤ xt is determined and xt − ct is returned to the
bank at the end of the period
– wealth next period is yt+1 = R(st + xt − ct )
The long-run self can implement a∗, the optimum of the problem without self-
control, by simply choosing pocket cash xt = (1−a∗)yt to be the target consumption.
In this way self-control costs might be avoided.
• At the nightclub in the first period there is a small probability the agent will be
offered a choice between several lotteries.
• The model predicts then that:
– for large gambles risk aversion is relative to wealth
– for small gambles it is relative to pocket cash
5Characterization results from Lewandowski (2011) are useful here.
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In this way the model can explain (Rabin 2000)’s paradox and the large buying and
selling price gap.
Gambling wealth vs. pocket cash An interesting feature of the Fudenberg and Levine
(2006) approach is the following. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) estimate pocket cash
to be roughly in the range of 20-100 dollars. This is very similar to the range of
gambling wealth values, which are consistent with the experimental evidence on the
buying/selling price gaps as indicated in Table 1. It is striking that the two entirely
different approaches result in a very similar range of values for the underlying
variable.
In spite of the similarities, the two concepts are nevertheless different from each
other. To illustrate the difference I will now discuss what testable predictions are
obtained in the Rabin (2000) paradox according to the dual self model with pocket
cash and what testable predictions are obtained according to the gambling wealth
approach.
Rabin (2000) calibrated that the expected utility model predicts the following:
• if a risk averse agent with wealth ≤ 350000 rejects the lottery
(105, 1/2; −100, 1/2)
• then he should reject the lottery (635000, 1/2; −4000, 1/2) at wealth level
340000
Denote the first of the above lotteries by lottery 1 and the second by lottery 2. Accord-
ing to Rabin (2000) the first statement is plausible and the second is not and hence it
is called a paradox.
In the dual-self model it is not true anymore that the decision maker rejects both
lotteries. The first lottery is small and hence it is evaluated relative to pocket cash. The
second lottery is big and therefore it is evaluated according to total wealth. Suppose
that the utility function is logarithmic. Then the following is true:
• lottery 1 small - reject if pocket cash < 2100
• lottery 2 large - accept if total wealth higher than 4035
Now both statements (pocket cash less than 2100 and total wealth higher than 4035)
are plausible.
Now consider the gambling wealth interpretation. Suppose that utility is logarith-
mic. If gambling wealth is less than 2100 then the decision maker should
• reject lottery 1
• reject lottery 2
There is nothing paradoxical in rejecting the second lottery since gambling wealth in
the amount of 2100 is too little to cover the loss (−4000) which occurs with prob-
ability 1/2. No matter how attractive the second prize is, the decision maker cannot
afford to take lottery 2.
Rabin’s paradox in the literature Although, in this paper, I adopt the lines of
Rubinstein (2006), and focus on the assumption of consequentialism, there have
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been other explanations for Rabin’s paradox in the literature. Palacios-Huerta and
Serrano (2006) claim that it is the assumption of rejecting small gambles over a
large range of wealth levels, which should be questioned as it does not match real-
world behavior. In particular they show that the assumption that an expected utility
maximizer turns down a given even-odds gamble with gain and loss for a given range
of wealth levels implies that there exists a positive lower bound on the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion which can be calculated exactly. This lower bound is an addi-
tional assumption imposed on a utility function. Palacios-Huerta and Serrano (2006)
show that in Rabin’s examples this lower bound turns out to be very high, which is
not consistent with empirical evidence. Another paper which addresses Rabin’s cri-
tique of expected utility is Cox and Sadiraj (2006). In a similar spirit to Rubinstein
(2006), they claim that Rabin in fact criticizes the expected utility model of terminal
wealth, in which there is a single preference relation over final wealth consequences.
They show that the expected utility of income model, in which prizes are interpreted
as changes in wealth levels, does not exhibit Rabin’s paradoxical behavior. In order
to enable the dependence of preference over income on initial wealth, they design
an expected utility of initial wealth and income model. They demonstrate that such a
model can withstand Rabin’s critique if initial wealth is not additive to income in the
utility function. Safra and Segal (2008) on the other hand point out that paradoxes of
the kind considered by Rabin are not specific to expected utility theory. They show
that they can be constructed in non-expected utility theories as well.
3 Preference reversal versus buying/selling price reversal
Preference reversal is commonly observed in experiments. Suppose that A C B
denotes “A preferred to B in a direct choice”. Using my notation, preference reversal
is possible if:
S(W, y) > S(W, x) and x C y
Preference reversal is not possible within the expected utility framework. To see
this, note that expected utility implies that x C y which can be equivalently written
as EU(W + x) > EU(W + y). By definition of S, this is equivalent to U(W +
S(W, x)) > U(W + S(W, x)) and since the utility function is strictly increasing:
S(W, x) > S(W, y). So expected utility implies the following:
S(W, y) > S(W, x) ⇐⇒ y C x (5)
On the other hand the buying/selling price reversal is possible within the expected
utility framework:
Proposition 3.1 For a given decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function and
any wealth level W , buying/selling price reversal is possible.
Proof In the Appendix.
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By condition (5) this proposition implies that expected utility admits the possibil-
ity of the following kind of preference reversal:
B(W, y) > B(W, x) and x C y
This kind of preference reversal will be referred to as preference reversal B. Pref-
erence reversal B is equivalent to buying/selling price reversal within the expected
utility framework.
Since expected utility theory imposes rather strong consistency assumptions, the
result above suggests that the possibility of preference reversal is less rational than
the related possibility of buying/selling price reversal or preference reversal B. The
following two propositions clarify the meaning of “less rational” beyond the strength
of consistency requirements argument.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that preferences of the decision maker are continuous,
monotonic and that the preference reversal pattern is fixed for the range of wealth
W ∈ [w, w¯]. Then arbitrage opportunities exist.
Proof In the Appendix.
Hence preference reversal allows arbitrage. On the other hand buying/selling price
reversal or preference reversal B does not allow arbitrage.
Proposition 3.3 Buying/selling price reversal does not allow arbitrage.
Proof In the Appendix.
The analysis shows that buying/selling price reversal, or preference reversal B,
is more rational than traditional preference reversal in two respects—it is consistent
with expected utility and it does not allow arbitrage.
Preference reversal B or buying/selling price reversals occur within expected
utility theory. However it does not mean that they have to be meaningful. If buy-
ing/selling price gap is small, then these two reversals are not meaningful i.e. they can
occur theoretically but the scope for their occurrence is negligible. For these reversals
to be meaningful, it is necessary for buying/selling price gap to be non-negligible.
Testing of preference reversal B might be therefore relevant only if wealth is inter-
preted narrowly, either as gambling wealth or pocket cash. It is not relevant if the
doctrine of consequentialism is maintained. I will illustrate this fact in the following
example.
Example 1 Suppose the utility function is CRRA with relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient of 2, the $-bet (denote it by x) gives $100 or $0 with equal probabilities and
the P-bet (denote it by y) gives $40 with probability 3/4 and $0 otherwise. Figure 2
contains graphs of buying and selling prices for these two lotteries as functions of
wealth.
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Fig. 2 Wealth region for buying/selling price reversal
In the above example, there is an interval (50, 75) of wealth for which buy-
ing/selling price reversal (and hence also preference reversal B) occurs6. This is
the common pattern that buying/selling price reversal occurs only at small wealth
and only in the limited interval of wealth. The reason is that for such reversal to
occur the $-bet has to have higher variance and higher expected value. Then as
wealth becomes large and the buying and selling price approach the expected value
of a lottery, these prices for the $-bet have to increase above those of the P-bet.
For smaller values of wealth, the CRRA decision maker would become very risk
averse, so he will be solely preoccupied by the gamble’s variance. Therefore, both
selling and buying price for the $-bet are below those of the P-bet. Technically
speaking, notice that if W ∗ denotes the wealth level at which selling price of x and
y are equal, i.e. S(W ∗, x) = S(W ∗, y) = S∗, then from definition it also holds
that S∗ = B(W ∗ + S∗, x) = B(W ∗ + S∗, y), so that B(W, x) crosses B(W, y) at
W = W ∗ + S∗. Hence the interval for which buying/selling price reversal occurs is
of length S∗ exactly.
4 Discussion on consequentialism
A typical behavioral paper first presents or discusses experimental evidence which
is not consistent with rationality assumptions of expected utility. Afterwards it
introduces or discusses a behavioral model capable of accommodating presented
evidence. When we talk about the inconsistency of a traditional theory with new
6The following holds S(50, y) = S(50, x) and B(75, y) = B(75, x).
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experimental evidence, it is important to identify what the term “traditional the-
ory” means exactly. Rubinstein (2006) claims that a lot of recent confusion around
expected utility, which led some researchers to question it as a descriptive theory, is
caused by associating expected utility theory with the assumption of consequential-
ism. Consequentialism is the idea that there is a single preference relation  over the
set of lotteries with prizes being the “final wealth levels” such that the decision maker
at any wealth level W who has a von Neumann Morgenstern preference relation W
over the set of “wealth changes” derives that preference from  by:
L1 W L2 ⇐⇒ W + L1  W + L2
where L1 and L2 are lotteries. Also, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) argue that the confusion
around expected utility is caused by the failure in the literature to distinguish between
expected utility theories, which stands for all models based on a set of axioms among
which there is the independence axiom, and a specific expected utility model. A
similar argument is also given in Palacios-Huerta and Serrano (2006)7. Based on
the above references, a clear distinction should be made between expected utility
theory, which is an abstract mathematical theory developed by von Neumann and
Morgenstern, and a specific expected utility model. Abstract mathematical theory
should be judged on different grounds than specific economic models of decision-
making which assume certain interpretation to the objects of choice, preference
relations, etc. For example von Neumann Morgenstern theory is silent about the iden-
tity of prizes in any given lottery. Hence, defining lottery prizes as being final wealth
levels (often assumed in expected utility models) or defining lottery prizes as being
changes relative to a reference point (as in prospect theory) is not part of expected
utility theory8.
As a result, seeking interpretation for abstract mathematical objects necessitates
imposing additional behavioral assumptions. Based on the specific interpretation
imposed we will classify expected utility models accordingly into:
• Traditional expected utility models
– Expected utility assuming consequentialism (Usually identified with
“expected utility” by much of the behavioral literature.)
– Expected utility with gambling wealth9
– Expected utility of wealth changes10
• Behavioral expected utility models
– Prospect Theory without probability weighting (only reference
dependence)
7Many of the aforementioned references focused their discussion around the Rabin (2000) paradox, but
these arguments are more general and refer to the whole debate about expected utility and behavioral
theories.
8This example shows that reference dependence in prospect theory is not a departure from expected utility
theory as a mathematical theory. On the other, probability weighting, which is the second building block
of prospect theory, clearly constitutes a departure from expected utility theory, because irrespective of the
interpretation, nonlinearity in the objectively given probabilities violates the independence assumption of
expected utility theory.
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– Expected disappointment model (Gul 1991)
– Regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Bell 1982)
Below I will try to illustrate the difference between these theories, limiting myself
to only the difference which is the basis for the above classification. Suppose there is
a lottery: with equal chances to win $12 or lose $10.
• Traditional expected utility models
– Expected utility assuming consequentialism
* Lottery payoffs defined as total wealth positions
* Single preference relation over lifetime wealth: e.g. $10mln.
* Accept if ($10 000 012, 0.5; 9 $999 990, 0.5)  $10 000 000
* Problem: (Rabin 2000) paradox
– EU with gambling wealth
* Treat decisions narrowly, reinterpret W , e.g. gambling wealth
instead of total wealth
* Accept if ($112, 0.5; $90, 0.5) $100
* E.g. relative changes (returns) and log utility function11
∗ Accept because 1.12 × 0.9 > 1
– EU of wealth changes
* Accept if ($12, 0.5; −$10, 0.5)  $0
* E.g. nominal changes and CARA utility function
* Examples: Game theory, Auction theory
• Behavioral expected utility models
– Prospect Theory without probability weighting
* The same as EU of wealth changes + loss aversion, reflection
effect, etc.
* If reference point current wealth then accept if
($12, 0.5; −$10, 0.5) $0
– Model of disappointment aversion
* Reference point: current wealth + E(L)
* Accept if ($11, 0.5; −$11, 0.5)  −$1
– Regret theory
* Reference point: other lottery
• Non-EU models
– Non-EU models are not linear in probabilities
9The term introduced in Foster and Hart (2009) and adopted throughout this paper.
10Used in general in much of game theory and in particular in the auction literature.
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– Examples:
* Probability weighting in PT
* Cumulative probability weighting in CPT
* Yaari (1987) dual theory of choice under risk
* Configural weighting, etc.
5 Expected utility over wealth changes
I argued above that dropping the assumption of consequentialism and interpreting
initial wealth narrowly as something much smaller than total wealth can explain
large buying and selling price gaps but cannot explain traditional preference rever-
sal involving WTA valuations. But in my approach, the consequentialist view, while
dropped, is replaced with something different only in quantitative and not qualitative
terms. I allow initial wealth to be small enough with a claim that it changes the inter-
pretation of initial wealth. This approach changes things only slightly in the following
sense: While in the case of total wealth interpretation of initial wealth, an individ-
ual’s preferences over wealth changes are induced from his preferences over final
wealth levels, in the case of gambling wealth, preferences over changes in gambling
wealth are induced from preferences over gambling wealth levels. In quantitative
terms, these two situations may be very different. However in a structural or quali-
tative sense, these two situations differ only marginally. A much more fundamental
departure from the consequentialism assumption would be the following—suppose
that the decision maker derives preference over lotteries not from preferences over
the resulting total position of whatever budget he might consider, but directly from
changes to this budget implied by accepting the lottery in question. This approach
was first undertaken by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal contribution.
In prospect theory, which was then proposed as an alternative to expected utility the-
ory, the decision maker has preferences directly over wealth changes relative to a
reference point. Rubinstein (2006) suggests that a similar approach is possible with-
out having to depart from expected utility theory by reinterpreting lottery prizes as
monetary change and not as total position. In what follows I will illustrate formally
that in such an approach both a large buying and selling price gap and preference
reversal are possible for a wide class of utility functions defined over wealth changes.
5.1 WTA/WTP disparity for preferences over wealth changes
Suppose U(·) is a utility function defined over changes in wealth, and hence over the
whole real line. It is assumed to be strictly increasing, continuous and that U(0) = 0.
Willingness to accept for lottery x, denoted by WT A(x), and willingness to pay for
11Notice that reference dependence is not a novel feature of Prospect Theory, but it exists in expected
utility models when prizes are interpreted as returns—relative reference dependence compared to nominal
reference dependence in Prospect Theory.
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lottery x, denoted by WT P(x), will be used here in place of S(W, x) and B(W, x),
respectively. They are defined as follows:
EU(WT A(x) − x) = 0 (6)
EU(x − WT P(x)) = 0 (7)
The meaning of these two measures is equivalent to the meaning of S(W, x) and
B(W, x) for the case of expected utility of wealth changes model.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that U(x) < −U(−x) for all x > 0. Then given any
nondegenerate lottery x, the following holds: WT A(x) > WT P(x).
Proof Denote A ≡ WT A(x) to save on notation.




pi[U(xi − A) − U(−(xi − A))] −
∑
i:xi≤A









The claim follows by monotonicity of U .
The above proposition is quite general. In what follows I will analyze two spe-
cial cases. In the original version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
the reference point was required to be constant. Hence it would be impossible to
define willingness to accept in this formulation. Schmidt et al. (2008) proposed a so
called ”third-generation prospect theory” in which the reference point is allowed to
be random. They defined willingness to accept and willingness to pay essentially as
in Eqs. 6 and 7 and showed first that a willingness to pay and willingness to accept
disparity is possible in prospect theory mainly due to loss aversion. Below I will
show my version of their result which shows that under certain symmetry conditions
the WTA/WTP gap occurs solely due to loss aversion. Consider the prospect theory
utility function with an imposed symmetry condition of the following form:
Assumption 2 Utility function for outcomes is of the following form:
U(x) =
{
u(x) if x ≥ 0
−λu(−x) if x < 0
where λ > 0 denotes the loss attitude parameter. If λ > 1, there is loss aversion.
Furthermore, a function u(·) is absolutely continuous, bounded, strictly increasing
with u(0) = 0 and concave on its domain.
The above utility function is concave for gains, convex for losses and for
λ = 1, it is symmetric around (0, 0), meaning that risk loving for losses is of the same
magnitude as risk aversion for gains. For λ > 1, there is loss aversion, which means
that a given gain brings less satisfaction than the dissatisfaction from the same loss.
274 J Risk Uncertain (2014) 48:253–283
Observe that this utility function satisfies U(x) < −U(−x) for all x > 0 if and
only if λ > 1. Hence for λ greater than one, meaning that there is loss aversion,
willingness to accept for any nondegenerate lottery exceeds willingness to pay by
Proposition 5.1. In fact for a utility function of the above form an even stronger result
holds, which I state below:
Proposition 5.2 For a nondegenerate lottery x and utility function of the form
defined by Assumption 2, the following holds:
λ > 1 ⇐⇒ WT A(x) > WT P(x)



















u(xi − A) < λ
∑
i:xi>A
u(xi − A) =
∑
i:xi≤A




And by monotonicity of u it follows immediately that A > P and hence WT A(x) >
WT P(x).
The above proposition shows that in prospect theory, a willingness to
accept/willingness to pay disparity may be explained solely by loss aversion.
An even simpler version of this result obtains in case of the prospect theory utility
function without risk aversion.
Assumption 3 Utility function for outcomes is of the following form:
U(x) =
{
x if x ≥ 0
λx if x < 0 (8)
Proposition 5.3 For a nondegenerate lottery x and utility function defined by
Assumption 3
λ > 1 ⇐⇒ WT A(x) > E[x] > WT P(x)
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= (1 − λ)
∑
i:xi>A




= (1 − λ)
∑
i:xi>A
pi(xi − A) + A − E[x]
< A − E[x]
The proof that E[x] > WT P(x) is similar and hence omitted.
In fact utility function defined by Assumption 3 is a special case of an overall
concave utility function for which a similar result holds:
Proposition 5.4 For a nondegenerate lottery x, given utility function u : R → R that
is strictly increasing, continuous and bounded with u(0) = 0, the following holds:
u(·) is concave ⇐⇒ WT A(x) ≥ E[x] ≥ WT P(x)
Proof By Jensen’s inequality:
0 = Eu(x − WT P(x)) ≤ u(E[x] − WT P(x))
0 = Eu(WT A(x) − x) ≤ u(WT A(x) − E[x])
Since u(0) = 0 and u is strictly increasing, the conclusion follows.
The conclusion of this section is that the gap between willingness to accept and
willingness to pay in the case of preferences defined over wealth changes and not
wealth levels may be explained by a kind of a general loss aversion, which is defined
by the requirement: u(x) < −u(−x), for all x > 0. This requirement defines a wide
class of available utility functions and in particular, an S shaped utility function with
sufficient level of loss aversion as well as a traditional overall concave utility function
over the whole real line satisfies this condition.
5.2 Preference reversal for preferences over wealth changes
First, recall that traditional preference reversal is not possible within expected util-
ity when preferences are defined over wealth levels, irrespective of whether these
wealth levels are interpreted narrowly as levels of gambling wealth, for instance, or
whether they are interpreted traditionally as total wealth levels. On the other hand,
when preferences are defined over wealth changes, it turns out that traditional pref-
erence reversal is possible. Schmidt et al. (2008) shows that preference reversal may
occur in third generation prospect theory. They calibrate for which values of param-
eters a quite general (and yet parametrized) version of prospect theory is compatible
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with preference reversal. Below I will show that for a very simple version of third
generation prospect theory, preference reversal is obtained as a generic element.
Let x ≡ (x, p) and y ≡ (y, q) be two prospects such that y > x > 0 and
1 > p > q > 0. Lottery x will be called the P-bet and lottery y will be called the
$-bet. In what follows I want to demonstrate that preference reversal is possible.
Lemma 3 For a utility function satisfying Assumption 3, the following holds: If
px = qy, so that the decision maker is indifferent between lottery x and y in a direct
choice, then
λ > 1 ⇐⇒ WT A(y) > WT A(x)
Proof From definitions I calculate that:
WT A(x) = λp
1 − p + λpx, WT A(y) =
λq
1 − q + λq y
Using the fact that px = qy, I obtain:
WT A(y) − WT A(x) = WT A(y) p − q
1 − p + λp (λ − 1)
The claim immediately follows.
Proposition 5.5 Given a utility function satisfying Assumption 3, preference reversal
is possible if and only if λ > 1
Proof Preference reversal occurs when the decision maker chooses the P-bet in a
direct choice but assigns higher willingness to accept to the $-bet. In terms of the
model, preference reversal occurs when px > qy and WT A(y) > WT A(x). By
Lemma 3, I know that if px = qy then WT A(y) > WT A(x) ⇐⇒ λ > 1.
Since utility function u(·) is continuous, it follows that willingness to accept as a
function of a given lottery is also continuous. Hence changing the lottery slightly
changes willingness to accept for it slightly. It follows that if initially px = qy and I
increase p or x slightly or decrease q or y slightly, the new lottery x will be preferred
to a new lottery y in a direct choice and yet it will remain true that willingness to
accept for a new lottery y will still be higher than willingness to accept for a new
lottery x.
Again, a more general result for concave functions is possible:
Lemma 4 Suppose that px = qy. Given utility function u : R → R that is strictly
increasing, continuous and bounded with u(0) = 0, the following holds:
u(·) is concave ⇐⇒ WT A(y) ≥ WT A(x)
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Proof Define A ≡ WT A(x) to save on notation. A satisfies the following equation:
pu(A − x) + (1 − p)u(A) = 0 (9)
The following classical result, called the three-strings lemma, is needed for the proof:
Lemma 5 (Three strings lemma) Utility function u(·) is concave if and only if for










Hence u(·) is concave if and only if
qu(A − y) + (1 − q)u(A) ≤ q A−y
A−x u(A − x) + (1 − q)u(A) [by (10)]






+ (p − q)u(A) [by (9)]
= u(A − x)qA−qy−pA+px
A−x + (p − q)u(A)








≤ 0 [by (10)]
Proposition 5.6 Suppose that px = qy. Preference reversal occurs if u(·)12 is
strictly concave.
Proof Suppose that u(·) is strictly concave. By Lemma 4, WT A(y) > WT A(x).





, by the three strings lemma for concave function u(·).
Hence the following holds:
Eu(x) = pu(x) > px
y
u(y) = qu(y) = Eu(y)
So lottery x or a P-bet is chosen over lottery y or a $-bet in a direct choice and yet
WT A(y) > WT A(x) as required.
Concavity of a utility function is sufficient for preference reversal in the above
example. However it is not necessary. In particular, Schmidt et al. (2008) show that
preference reversal is possible with an S-shaped prospect utility function, which
is convex for losses. If one wants to obtain a possibility of preference reversal
for specific lotteries and not as a generic feature of the model, then the following
requirement, which is weaker than the overall concavity of the utility function, may
12Strictly increasing, continuous and u(0) = 0.
278 J Risk Uncertain (2014) 48:253–283
be imposed: For a given P-bet and a given $-bet and utility function u(·), define
A = WT A(x). Then:
u(A − y)
A − y >
u(A − x)




Expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) imposes a set
of consistency assumptions on choices among lotteries. The theory is used in a
large part of economic theory, including the famous Nash existence theorem. How-
ever there is a lot of mainly experimental evidence that people often violate von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms, in particular the most crucial among
them—independence. In response to this evidence economists started to ques-
tion expected utility theory and investigate other models of choice which describe
human behavior better. However, since these new theories usually have lower
consistency requirements being imposed on the admissible choice, they neces-
sarily also have lower prediction power and less scope for testable predictions.
Moreover, they also have weaker normative appeal, since the decision makers vio-
lating expected utility axioms are vulnerable to money pumps. It is therefore an
important issue to identify patterns of choices and behavior which are consistent
with expected utility and contrast them with those which are impossible within
expected utility. In order to perform this task it is important to identify expected
utility theory in its bare form and in particular separate it from the doctrine of
consequentialism. More precisely, it is necessary to abandon the common prac-
tice of interpreting the wealth variable as total wealth position common to all
decisions.
If one is willing to accept that wealth underlying gambling decisions is separated
from total wealth so that gambling decisions are framed narrowly, important implica-
tions can be derived. If gambling wealth is small enough, which should be tested in
an experiment, then selling price for a lottery can be significantly greater than buying
price without going beyond the expected utility model, and the extent of this differ-
ence can be as high as the one found in experiments. Also, the famous (Rabin 2000)
paradox can be resolved, suggesting that expected utility is not guilty here, but rather
the doctrine of consequentialism.
Still, traditional preference reversal is not possible even if wealth is allowed to
be small. If expected utility is to be regarded as a positive theory, it is definitely a
negative result. However, if one is willing to accept expected utility as a good nor-
mative theory, then the same result is very useful. It informs us then that preference
reversal is not rational. It is confirmed further by the result proved in the paper, that
individuals exhibiting preference reversal are susceptible to arbitrage under certain
mild conditions. The same kind of arbitrage, which I prefer to call strong arbitrage,
is not possible within expected utility. What might be interesting is that another
kind of preference reversal, which I call preference reversal B and which involves
buying price in place of selling price and otherwise is the same as the traditional
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preference reversal, is possible within expected utility and is not vulnerable to
arbitrage as shown in the paper.
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Appendix
In what follows I will need the following lemma:
Lemma 6 For any lottery x and any wealth level W , the following holds:
S[W, x − B(W, x)] = 0 (11)
S[W − B(W, x), x] = B(W, x) (12)
B[W + S(W, x), x] = S(W, x) (13)
The proof is directly from definitions. For details, see Lewandowski (2011).
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Notice first, that for degenerate lottery x = x, Eqs. 1 and 2 imply S(W, x) =
B(W, x) = x. From now on I will focus on a non-degenerate lottery x. I will
prove the proposition only for the case of selling price. For buying price the proof
is similar. I define S ≡ S(W, x). Suppose mini∈{1,...,n} xi ≥ S. Then notice that:
U(W + xi) ≥ U
(
W + mini∈{1,...,n} xi
) ≥ U(W + S) with strict inequality for
any xi = mini∈{1,...,n} xi . Since lottery x is non-degenerate there exists at least one
xi = mini∈{1,...,n} xi Hence ∑ni=1 piU(W + xi) > U(W + S) So S cannot be the
selling price—a contradiction.
Suppose now that S ≥ E[x]. By strict Jensen’s inequality EU [W + x] < U [W +
E[x]] ≤ U(W + S) So S cannot be the selling price—a contradiction. So I have
shown that indeed mini∈{1,...,n} xi < S(W, x) < E[x].
Proof of Proposition 2.1




{ − 11−α , 0 < α < 1−∞, α ≥ 1 (14)
By Proposition 1.1 buying and selling prices are necessarily greater than min(x). For
α ≥ 1 the utility function is unbounded from below, therefore from the definition
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it follows that: limW→0 B(W, x) = min(x) and limW→−min(x) S(W, x) = min(x).
On the other hand for 0 < α < 1 the utility function is bounded from below. Addi-
tionally, W − B(W, x) is strictly increasing in W since ∂B(W,x)
∂W
< 1. Therefore
the lower bound for the domain of B(W, x) as a function of W is given by WL(x)
such that: EU(− min(x) + x) = U(WL(x)). It follows that limW→WL(x) B(W, x) =
WL(x) + min(x). Similarly, the lower bound for the domain of S(W, x) as a func-
tion of W is − min(x) and hence: limW→−min(x) S(W, x) = WL(x) + min(x) since
EU(− min(x) + x) = U(− min(x) + S(− min(x), x)) = U(− min(x) + min(x) +
U−1(EU(− min(x) + x)))
Now I prove the following statement: ∀α > 0, limW→∞ B(W, x) =
limW→∞ S(W, x) = E[x]. Note that the Absolute Risk Aversion for a CRRA utility
function has the form Aα(W) = αW . Hence as W goes to infinity and α is bounded(no extreme risk aversion) Aα(W) tends to zero. This implies risk neutrality and
hence limW→∞ S(W, x) = limW→∞ B(W, x) = E[x] irrespective of the relative risk
aversion coefficient.
Proof of Lemma 1
I prove first that B ′(W) < 1. From the definition of buying price using implicit func-
tion formula: dB
dW
= 1 − U ′(W)EU ′(W+x−B(W,x)) Since utility function is strictly increasing
it must be that dB
dW
< 1.
Now I prove that S ′(W − B(W)) = B′(W)1−B′(W) and S ′(W − B(W)) > B ′(W).
From Lemma 6 (12), using the chain rule of differentiation, I have B ′(W) =
S ′(W −B(W))(1−B ′(W)). Rearranging gives S ′(W −B(W)) = B′(W)1−B′(W) Since 0 <
B ′(W) < 1 by the above argument and Proposition 1.3, I obtain S ′(W − B(W)) >
B ′(W).
Similarly I prove that B ′(W + S(W)) = S ′(W)1+S ′(W) and B ′(W + S(W)) < S ′(W).
Using Eq. 13 from Lemma 6, I have S ′(W) = B ′(W +S(W))(1+S ′(W)) and hence
B ′(W + S(W)) = S ′(W)1+S ′(W) Since S ′(W) > 0 by Proposition 1.3, I get B ′(W +
S(W)) < S ′(W).
Now I will prove that S ′(W) = S(W)−B(W)
B(W)
for small positive S(W). And by
Proposition 1.3 S(W) > B(W) > 0. So when S(W) is small and positive, then also
B(W) is small and positive. By Lemma 6 (12), S(W − B(W)) = B(W). For small
B(W) using first order Taylor expansion B(W) = S(W) − dS
dW
B(W) and hence it
follows that S ′(W) = S(W)−B(W)
B(W)
. Similarly, by Lemma 6 (13), B(W + S(W)) =
S(W). Hence, for small S(W) using first order Taylor expansion S(W) = B(W) +
dB
dW
S(W) and it follows that B ′(W) = S(W)−B(W)
S(W)
.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Without loss of generality I assume that min(x) = 0. Fix x such that min(x) = 0.
By Proposition 2.1, B(W) and S(W) are positive and hence by Proposition 1.3
τ (W) is positive over the whole range. Notice that range of τ (W) is determined
by Proposition 2.1. If the domain of S(W) is denoted DS and the domain of B(W)
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is denoted DB , then the domain of τ (W) is just DS ∩ DB = DB . In particular,
for α ≥ 1 the domain of τ (W) is the interval (0,∞) and for α ∈ (0, 1), the
domain is the interval (WL(x),∞), where WL(x) is defined as in Proposition
2.1. To prove the proposition I have to check whether the following expression is
negative:










From Lemma 6 I have the following equations: B(W) = S(W − B(W)), and
S(W) = B(W +S(W)) For the proof, first order effects are not sufficient, but it turns
out second order effects are. Therefore, by Taylor expansion of the second order I
get from the above equations: B(W) = S(W) − S ′(W)B(W) + S ′′(W)B2(W) and
S(W) = B(W) + B ′(W)S(W) + B ′′(W)S2(W). I only need to check the difference

















′′(W)B2(W) + B ′′(W)S2(W)
S(W)B(W)
< 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that both B(W) and S(W) are concave
(by Lemma 2) and nonnegative (by Proposition 2.1).
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Take any non-degenerate lottery y with S(W, y) > B(W, y). Such a lottery exists
by Proposition 1.3. I can find a sequence of real numbers which all are greater than
B(W, y) and smaller than S(W, y). I can then treat these numbers as a support for
a new lottery x. I assign probabilities to each of these numbers such that they sum
to one and are positive for at least two of these numbers (such that the resulting
lottery is non-degenerate). Suppose I choose n such numbers. By Proposition 1.1 I
can now conclude that S(W, y) > maxi∈{1,...,n} xi > E[x] > S(W, x) > B(W, x) >
mini∈{1,...,n} xi > B(W, y).
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose that at any wealth W ∈ [w, w¯] the decision maker prefers lottery x to lottery
y in a direct choice but assigns higher certainty equivalent to lottery y. Given such a
pattern of preferences it is easy to design an arbitrage strategy that extracts at least
W −w from this decision maker. Suppose W ∈ [w, w¯] is an initial wealth. Construct
a sequence Wi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that:
• W0 = W
• Wi = W0 − ∑ik=1 k, i > 0 i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n• Wn ≥ w, Wn+1 < w
• for i even (including 0) Wi+1 + x  Wi + y
• for i odd: CE(Wi + x) < CE(Wi+1 + y)
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Notice that such a sequence exists by monotonicity and continuity of preferences and
by properties of real numbers. Assume w.l.o.g. that W0 + y  W0. The arbitrage
strategy is now the following:
0) Take y
1) Exchange y for x and pay me 1
2) Exchange x for CE(W1 + x) − W1
3) Exchange CE(W1 + x) for CE(W1 + y) and pay me 2
4) Exchange CE(W2 + y) − W2 for y
5) Repeat
The above arbitrage strategy extracts the amount of wealth equal to W − w from the
decision maker.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
In what follows I will try to construct an arbitrage strategy to exploit the decision
maker and show that it is not possible. Given a DARA utility function U , take x such
that B(W, x) < 0. I will examine only this case since in the other cases the proof is
trivial.
Suppose first, the decision maker initially has non-random position W . If the price
b for the lottery is bigger than B(W, x), the decision maker will not buy it. Hence,
a price which is a part of an arbitrage strategy must be smaller than B(W, x). Given
such price b, the decision maker buys the lottery. His new position is W + x − b. If
the price s is smaller than S(W −b, x), then the decision maker does not want to sell.
Hence a price which is a part of an arbitrage strategy must be bigger than S(W−b, x).
By Proposition 1.3, I know that S is strictly increasing and b < B(W, x). Therefore:
s > S(W − b, x) > S(W − B(W, x), x) = B(W, x) > b
where the equality follows from Lemma 6 (12).
Suppose now, that the decision maker initially has a random position W + x. By
the same argument as above the price s, which is a part of an arbitrage strategy has
to be greater than S(W, x), otherwise the decision maker would not sell the lottery
x. After selling the lottery, the decision maker’s new position is W + s. The price
b which is a part of an arbitrage strategy has to be smaller than B(W + s, x). By
Lemma 1, I know that ∂B(W,x)
∂W
≤ 1 for all W ≥ 0. Hence:
s − S(W, x) > B(W + s, x) − B(W + S(W, x), x)
By Lemma 6 (13), I know that B(W + S(W, x), x) = S(W, x), and hence:
s > B(W + s, x) > b
That proves that with decision maker’s initial position equal to either W or W +x, all
arbitrage strategies have the property that s > b. However, this cannot be an arbitrage
strategy since it makes negative profit equal to b − s. This proves that there are no
arbitrage strategies.
J Risk Uncertain (2014) 48:253–283 283
References
Bell, D.E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30, 961–981.
Chilton, S., Jones-Lee, M., McDonald, R., Metcalf, H. (2012). Does the WTA/WTP ratio diminish as the
severity of a health complaint is reduced? Testing the smoothness of the underlying utility of wealth
function. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 45, 1–24.
Cox, J.C., & Sadiraj, V. (2006). Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: implications of concavity calibration
for decision theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 56, 45–60.
Foster, D., & Hart, S. (2009). An operational measure of riskiness. Journal of Political Economy, 117,
758–814.
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D.K. (2006). A dual-self model of impulse control. American Economic Review,
96, 1449–1476.
Grether, D.M., & Plott, C.R. (1979). Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon.
American Economic Review, 69, 623–638.
Gul, F. (1991). A theory of disappointment aversion. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,
59, 667–686.
Hanemann, W.M. (1991). Willingness to pay and willingness to accept: how much can they differ?
American Economic Review, 81, 635–647.
Horowitz, J.K., & McConnell, K.E. (2002). A review of WTA/WTP studies. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 44, 426–447.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica,
47, 263–292.
Knetsch, J.L., & Sinden, J.A. (1984). Willingness to pay and compensation demanded: experimental evi-
dence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 507–
521.
Lewandowski, M. (2011). Risk attitudes, buying and selling price for a lottery and simple strategies. http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2189406.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under
uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.
Palacios-Huerta, I., & Serrano, R. (2006). Rejecting small gambles under expected utility. Economics
Letters, 91, 250–259.
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem. Econometrica, 68(5),
1281–1292.
Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision analysis: introductory lectures on choices under uncertainty. Addison-Wesley.
Rubinstein, A. (2006). Dilemmas of an economic theorist. Econometrica, 74, 865–883.
Safra, Z., & Segal, U. (2008). Calibration results for non-expected utility theories. Econometrica, 76,
1143–1166.
Schmidt, U., Starmer, C., Sugden, R. (2008). Third-generation prospect theory. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 36, 203–223.
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 1(1), 39–60.
Viscusi, W.K., & Huber, J. (2012). Reference-dependent valuations of risk: why willingness-to-accept
exceeds willingness-to-pay. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 44, 19–44.
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Yaari, M.E. (1987). The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 55(1), 95–115.
